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ABSTRACT This article presents the findings of a study examining the rationale and
practices of stock transfer from state housing authorities to community housing associ-
ations in three Australian states—Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania. It begins
with an analysis of the policy context that has informed debates about housing
management and supply options in Australia. The main section of the article draws on
written documentation and interviews with policy actors and tenants in each of the case
studies to highlight the conflicts and tensions that surface in moves to reconfigure the
management of public housing. Alongside a brief discussion about the policy themes that
emerge from the findings, it is suggested in the conclusion that the continuing
contestation and uncertainty about the stock transfer process is symptomatic of the
national ‘policy vacuum’ about the future direction of public housing in Australia.
KEY WORDS: community housing associations, stock transfer process, public
housing
Introduction
In Australia, there is a paucity of research examining the role of non-government
agencies in the management of housing services. There is also very little research
that places the relationship between public, private and non-profit housing
providers in a broader mixed economy of welfare context. Yet, the developments
taking place within contemporary housing policy stem from a set of processes
that have affected welfare provision not just in Australia but also in Europe and
North America (see Cahill, 1994). These include governments’ willingness to
impose controls on the availability of resources for welfare provision, support
for private sector agencies to undertake many of the activities formerly associ-
ated with direct state provision and the focus on individual responsibility and
self-help in discourses about the future of welfare. For example, the endorse-
Correspondence Address: Dr Keith Jacobs, Private Bag 17, University of Tasmania, Hobart,
TAS 7001, Australia. Fax: 61 (0)3 6226 2279; Tel.: 61 (0)3 6226 2928; Email:
keith.Jacobs@utas.edu.au
0811-1146 Print/1476-7244 Online/04/030249-15 © 2004 Editorial Board, Urban Policy and Research
DOI: 10.1080/0811114042000269281
250 K. Jacobs et al.
ment of ‘self-help’ is implicit in the current Commonwealth State Housing
Agreement in the section that contains a new focus on securing employment
opportunities for public tenants (Family and Community Services [FACS], 2003,
p. 22).
The orthodox view is that those nation-states that maintain tight fiscal
control and stimulate private sector activity and civic responsibility are most
likely to secure economic benefits. A fundamental restructuring of the welfare
state is seen as a necessary course of action by most governments in the
developed world. One of the clearest examples of this restructuring is provided
by recent developments in the management and ownership of public housing
(i.e. budgetary constraints, public and private sector partnerships and stock
diversification programs).
The Policy Context
In recent years, public housing has become a residualised tenure in Australia’s
housing system with as many as 90 per cent of the 346 000 households in public
housing relying on income support. As many as two-thirds of these tenants are
aged and disability support pensioners (Productivity Commission, 2004). In
2003, a Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (CSHA) for the period 2003–
2008 was finalised under which state housing authorities (SHAs) are expected to
establish new partnerships with private and non-profit sectors to secure addi-
tional investment for the housing stock. There is also an expectation within the
current CSHA that SHAs should seek to extend ‘consumer choice’, tenant
participation, employment and capacity building opportunities by supporting
alternative smaller housing providers such as community housing associations
(FACS, 2003).
A major driver of housing policy has been declining funding for public
housing. For example, government assistance for public housing provided
through the auspices of the CSHA has declined in real funding terms by almost
15 per cent between 1990 and 2000 (Steering Committee for the Review of
Commonwealth/State Service Provision, 2000, p. 1357). The reduction of funds
has placed significant pressure on SHAs to establish ‘alternative’ forms of
housing provision either in the private sector or through the non-profit sector as
a way of ultimately circumventing this shortfall of funds. An efficiently man-
aged community housing sector is seen as the basis for attracting private
investment to drive the growth of social housing. However, as the case studies
show, there is no clear consensus about the best way to implement such a
strategy, and no evidence or indication that it will result in more social housing
being provided for a reduced or even the same outlay.
The rationale underlying the growth of community housing is that multiple
providers increase the choices available to tenants as ‘consumers’, and to
government as the ‘purchaser’ of social housing services, and that choice in turn
results in outcomes more tailored to the individual needs of applicants (see
Mant, 1992; National Housing Strategy, 1992; Industry Commission, 1993; Darcy,
1996). It is also the case that the growth of long-term community housing has
been driven by a programmatic response on the part of successive Federal and
State governments (through initiatives such as the CSHA Community Housing
Program), in conjunction with community-based initiatives. It has been argued
that the growth of community housing has taken place because of ‘top-down’
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processes and from the impetus set in place by the community sector itself
(Darcy, 1999; Farrar et al., 2003). Despite these developments occurring over the
last 20–30 years the long-term community housing sector still only represents
about 1 per cent of total housing stock in Australia.
New policies and practices in the social housing sector have in the past, and
are likely to continue to draw on models developed in the UK to encourage
private sector and non-government agencies to manage and maintain public
sector housing. Voluntary transfers of municipal stock, discounts for tenants to
buy their council property, alongside extra resources for housing associations
have been a feature of UK social housing for a considerable period (see Jacobs,
1999; Malpass & Mullins, 2002). Since 1988, 118 municipal landlords (local
authorities) have transferred nearly 600 000 homes to housing associations
(registered social landlords) under the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT)
and the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) (National Audit Office, 2001).
In the UK, there have been closely related developments in allocation practices
across multiple providers involving not only common registers, but also ‘nomi-
nation rights’ for the transferring authorities (Clapham & Kintrea, 1994; Murie,
1995). Tenants also have the option to veto stock transfer proposals through a
ballot (Malpass, 2000; Malpass & Mullins, 2002). On some London estates and in
Birmingham, tenant activist campaigns calling for tenants to reject stock transfer
proposals were successful. The examples of stock transfer in the UK context
provide useful information about what sort of regulatory framework is appro-
priate in Australia and the difficulties that can arise when tenants organise to
oppose the transfer of stock. A number of states and territories are in the process
of developing regulatory frameworks for the community housing sector. These
governance questions concern the principles of accountability and transparency
and the sorts of relations that are appropriate between government and com-
munity organisations.
Case Studies
The empirical research for this article was undertaken in late 2003 and entailed
the following tasks: collecting data on current practices and policies in relation
to stock transfer in the three states; 30 interviews with key actors working for
SHAs and community housing organisations (10 per case study); and three focus
group discussions (one in each case study) with tenants to ascertain their
expectations and experiences of public and community housing (24 tenants in
total). The following sections report on the key findings.
Victoria
Community housing in Victoria represents less than 1 per cent of total housing
stock, while public housing constitutes about 4 per cent. In terms of the social
housing sector alone, community housing represents about 8 per cent of all
social housing dwellings (AIHW, 2003). These figures indicate that community
housing is a relatively marginal tenure in the housing system, yet it fulfils an
important function for many low-income households. Victoria has around 7500
units1 of housing that are either owned or managed by local government and
community housing organisations. Currently, there are about 9000 households
assisted by community housing in Victoria. Most of the community housing
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stock has been acquired through capital grants provided through the CSHA,
however, there are also a number of joint ventures in operation. In terms of stock
profile, Victoria only has around 600 properties that are head-leased (AIHW,
2003).
Controversy and contestation. From the outset it is important to note that stock
transfers from public to community housing is one of the most contentious
issues in Victorian housing policy discourse. A representative from a peak
community housing provider in Victoria argued that:
stock transfers are probably the crunch issue because whilst there is this
theoretical desire to grow these associations, certainly there’s a lack of
capital dollars around to do that. So one of the suggested ways to
acquire properties was to transfer them across. I admit that that’s
controversial, and how do you hand over what is a public asset to a
community organisation, which is I guess the driving force behind
regulation.
Further evidence about the contested nature of stock transfers can be found
in the publication of the Social Housing Innovations Project (SHIP) in 2000. The
SHIP report was commissioned by the Office of Housing, Department of Human
Services and was authored by Hal Bisset (2000). The SHIP, which fell under the
State government’s broader Social Housing Program initiative, provides a useful
exemplar of the arguments that are raised for and against stock transfers. Bisset’s
consultancy report was commissioned to seek out innovative affordable housing
solutions, look at funding models for successful projects elsewhere, and assess
these solutions and make recommendations. The report was written against a
backdrop of decreasing supply of affordable rental housing in the private rental
market and increasing demand for affordable housing.
The SHIP report was accompanied by $94.5 million worth of State govern-
ment funding, which involved seeking expressions of interest from organisations
such as churches and community groups to develop innovative housing
projects.2 More recently, the Victorian government has announced a commit-
ment to commence the development of four new Affordable Housing Associa-
tions, to expand housing for older Victorians, people with a disability, and in
designated regional areas. These initiatives were spurred on by the ideas
contained in the SHIP report.
In broad terms, the SHIP report sought to build widespread support for
community housing and it contained a number of recommendations that fa-
voured the development of community housing through the growth of housing
associations. Bisset (2000, p. 18) defines a housing association as a “not-for-profit
community organisation with capacity to develop, own and manage social
housing”. The report recommended that one strategy for pursuing the develop-
ment of housing associations could be through the transfer of about 18 000 of the
state’s 66 000 public housing properties to 20 new housing associations. The
release of the report, and this recommendation in particular, created a great deal
of controversy in the media and among community sector organisations and
public tenant advocates. The Housing for the Aged Action Group (HAAG), for
example, ran a public campaign under the slogan: “Sink the S.H.I.P campaign”.
The campaign was based on continuing support for public housing and a desire
to avoid competition between public and community in a policy environment
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driven by limited capital expenditure, an ageing public housing stock portfolio
and a shrinking supply of affordable housing in the private rental market.
There were also concerns expressed by tenant advocates about accountabil-
ity arrangements and allocation and eligibility policies. The HAAG argued that
the public system does work and that the SHIP report represented “… an
attempt by vested interests to wrest control of a substantial proportion of public
housing” (HAAG, 2001). Other concerns raised by tenant advocates were that
the transfer would lead to a more residualised public housing system, erode
tenants rights and would jeopardise affordability (Melbourne Times, 22 August
2001). In 2001, The Age and The Melbourne Times ran a series of articles that
echoed the divided views about large-scale stock transfers. Kenneth Davidson,
a staff columnist, wrote an opinion piece in The Age (16 August 2001), where he
criticised the proposal as transferring public assets into private hands.
What was at stake in this debate is whether the provision of affordable,
accessible and appropriate housing is a public or private responsibility? Some
tenant advocates in Victoria are keen to cast community housing as private
provision, yet many community housing providers see themselves as occupying
a ‘third space’, between the market and the government. A representative from
a large community housing provider in Victoria stated that non-government
organisations need to be seen differently to private for-profit organisations:
I mean the basis of the Ken Davidson article was that he went the
whole hog. He crossed over directly from public sector to private sector
missing in one full swoop the NGO component, which is a pretty
critical one.
Whether stock transfers is a subtle form of privatisation or a distinctive sphere
of operation mediating the relationship between citizens and governments
remains a very controversial and sensitive issue in Victoria, particularly given
the recent history of privatisation in Victoria under the Kennett Government.
A need for clarity. In part, the debate concerning tenants’ rights and the
appropriate level of private sector funds set out above, reflect a need for bold
political leadership to articulate the definition of the policy problem and the
proposed solutions. The need for more clarity about the future of social housing
was a common interview theme raised by providers, tenant advocates and
tenants. As one tenant said:
so at the moment there’s no clarity of what rent setting would look like,
there’s no clarity around securing a tenure issue, there’s no clarity
around access … is it a common waiting list, is it a single purpose
waiting list, what does that look like?
Some of the tenant advocates were critical of the lack of direction and openness
about the future of public and community housing in Victoria:
basically the problem is that a lot of the discussion has occurred
‘confidentially’, and so things have been put on the table but nobody
actually knows what the firm policy is. So whilst stock transfer is
something that’s been talked about, in Victoria at least, there’s no stated
policy.
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In an effort to increase clarity there was a desire by tenant advocates to have
a policy framework in place for making these sorts of decisions, a policy
framework that puts tenant outcomes first: “We need mandated outcomes so
we’ve got some certainty and safety.” The sorts of mandated outcomes that were
discussed in the interviews included affordability, accessibility, appropriateness,
tenure security, housing standards, participation structures, dispute resolution
and amenity. These outcomes were discussed in the context of an appropriate
regulatory framework for community housing in Victoria. There was a concern
expressed that ‘system needs’ such as financial viability, stock profiling and
infrastructure should not take on “a life of their own”, without any clear
commitment to tenant outcomes.
While everyone wanted to see these ideas developed and discussed there
was also cynicism expressed about the possibility of this happening in the near
future. There was a sense in which the politics of policy making and the contest
between different interests was getting in the way of setting clear directions, as
indicated by a representative from a peak community housing provider: “To me
that’s why things just ground to a halt you know, instead of working coopera-
tively and in goodwill.” One community housing provider felt that there needed
to be a clear financial game plan in order to move things forward in Victoria:
It’s not about community housing management versus public housing
management. It’s all about finance. They either are going to transfer
stock which needs major modification or upgrade, and they don’t have
the money to do that, or else if they’re going to transfer stock which
provides a basis … a financing basis to construct in growth supply. So
I don’t think the [community] sector should be naive about what the
aims and intentions are, and I don’t think there are bad intentions. So
that’s the first thing. The second thing is the requirement of the
community housing sector to lead a proper consultation process, it
should present its best face to the tenants and develop its own social
contract with the tenants … we shouldn’t require the public housing
authority to make all the moves.
This last part of the above excerpt draws attention to the dilemma of stock
transfer in the context of a community housing sector that is in part a direct
consequence of programmatic funding and tax measures provided by govern-
ment. The sector wants to represent itself as different to government provision,
yet at the same time it is highly dependent on all levels of government for its
capital and recurrent funding. Advocates for community housing seek to pro-
vide locally responsive, participatory forms of housing provision. Yet at the
same time, the sector remains highly dependent on government support, which
some advocates argue undermines the capacity for flexibility, innovation and
autonomy.
The other challenge is that expanding ‘third sector’ forms of service pro-
vision through stock transfers has little impact on either the dominance of the
market or the shrinking role of the state, or what Gilbert (2002) refers to as the
‘silent surrender of public responsibility’. Some interviewees expressed a con-
cern that stock transfers from public to community housing may do little more
than shift deck chairs, while failing to address the structural problems of limited
supply and increasing unaffordability. As one tenant advocate stated: “There’s
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no suggestion that even housing associations are going to deal with the housing
crisis because the amount of extra stock they might create is minimal.”
Despite the recommendations of the SHIP report and the announcements of
the government to develop growth housing associations, there has been no
large-scale stock transfer in Victoria and there is no clear government position
on whether this will happen in the future. At the time of writing, it remains
unclear whether large-scale stock transfer will be a part of the funding strategy
for the government’s election commitment to develop the four growth housing
associations.
New South Wales
In New South Wales (NSW), of around 140 000 social housing dwellings (ap-
proximately 6 per cent of total housing stock), housing associations and co-oper-
atives account for about 9000 dwellings. While still a relatively small sector, this
represents an increase of more than 250 per cent since 1995. Close to one-third
of this growth has been achieved through the transfer of the management of
properties from the SHA mainly to a small number of housing associations
termed ‘growth associations’. It is important to note that in NSW housing
associations do not hold freehold title to these dwellings. The bulk of their stock
is leased on the private market for sub-letting to tenants, while so-called
‘transferred’ stock, while managed by associations, remains the property of the
State Land and Housing Corporation (L&HC).
Policy history. Since the mid-1990s the Department of Housing (DoH) has made
clear its intentions to use this limited form of stock transfer as a strategy to
address management problems on large estates, and also to stimulate innovation
and improved efficiency in the broader social housing sector (NSW Department
of Housing, 1999). Following the announcement that 900 properties would be
transferred to the 17 housing associations identified for growth across NSW by
July 1999, protocols were developed to govern the transfers. The protocol
focused on ensuring a ‘consistent framework to develop appropriate strategies
for determining the location, nature and timing of property transfers’ and is
largely concerned with financial and administrative arrangements between
Office of Community Housing (OCH) and DoH.
In line with the focus of the protocol, early transfers consisted almost
exclusively of vacant properties in line with the focus of the protocol. In the
push to achieve targets up to 10 per cent of the units identified for transfer were
tenanted at the time, and many of these tenants ultimately transferred their
leases to housing associations (Darcy, 1999; Darcy & Stringfellow, 2001). Despite
the fact that legal title to the properties remains with the L&HC, the protocol
stated that properties should ideally be separately titled or capable of separate
title (NSW Department of Housing and Office of Community Housing, 1997).
This would have the effect either of discounting a large number of properties
from being transferred or of ensuring that dwellings would mainly be trans-
ferred as whole blocks, streets or even estates since a considerable number of
DoH properties are on ‘superlots’ (large subdivisions of land) and individual
dwellings are not on separate titles.
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Renewed interest. Following this initial period, there was little transfer activity
in the state until 2003 when funds were set aside for a program of 1000 transfers
in the current budget year. It was reported by interviewees that these would be
transfers of tenanted properties. Nonetheless, in recent years individual housing
associations have taken on management of a substantial number (“some hun-
dreds” according to one interviewee) of new properties constructed in the course
of redevelopment of old public housing areas—in these cases, housing associa-
tions have been invited to submit expressions of interest in managing stock and
the State Authority has retained nomination rights for an agreed proportion of
allocations, although one senior DoH interviewee told us “that’s atro-
phied … that doesn’t happen”.
A number of interviewees indicated that they believe that the State Auth-
ority is developing plans to rapidly accelerate the transfer program through
either or both of two initiatives:
• a mass transfer of 1000–2000 units to one existing large housing association,
and/or
• the creation of a new autonomous entity, from an existing unit of the DoH,
with management of up to 2000 units.
One housing association interviewee spoke of plans to transfer up to 10 000
units. It should be pointed out that although there are no formal policy
documents available to support this contention, it appears to be widely accepted.
Certainly all of the DoH operational managers and housing association peak
organisation staff who participated in interviews believed that transfers would
be significant over the next 5 years.
Contradictory perceptions. Thus, current plans to revisit stock transfer, an-
nounced or rumoured, were of considerable interest for those interviewed for
this project. However, based on an analysis of their responses, there is little
consensus as to the reasons for pursuing such a policy as the means of
expanding community housing. Contradictions and confusion are apparent, not
just between the understanding and perception of different policy players, but
within the responses provided by even the most experienced and centrally
placed respondents.
DoH operational managers see the renewed policy interest in transfers in
very positive terms, and along with other interviewees, referred broadly to the
need for housing associations to grow in order to achieve management econom-
ies. This group, however, consistently referred to the fact that housing associ-
ation tenants are eligible for Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA), and thus
having a greater proportion of tenants in community housing would produce a
larger income stream for social housing in general. They saw this as a key policy
driver, despite the fact that associations do not receive CRA as rent, but merely
assess it as income, meaning that only 25 per cent comes back into the system.
Housing association managers were much more likely to refer to the
possibility of gearing new finance into the system through secured debts, but
took the opportunity to stress that this would not be possible unless associations
were given mortgageable title to property. Housing association managers were
more circumspect about the prospects of a renewed push for larger scale
transfers and referred to past experience where they felt that they had little
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influence over stock selection in terms of location or condition—they referred to
the additional costs of managing housing on large estates
not just collecting the rent and doing repairs and maintenance, but
actually looking at the social issues within housing estates is far more
labour intensive.… The Department of Housing is not enforcing the
nomination rights, … it could be quite disastrous for us if on a hundred
of the three hundred houses we have the Department had nomination
rights.
Not surprisingly, DoH operational managers took quite a different view—
they saw transfers on large estates as being central to the aims of the program,
not only as a way of diversifying management on estates, but also as a means
of equalising the standard of housing between Associations and the Department:
“if Housing Associations don’t take transfers (in estates) then … they would end
up with less overall but probably better quality housing … it will further
stigmatise Public Housing as the absolute last resort”.
Housing association managers also referred to the lower pay and working
conditions they were able to provide. In turn, this suggests that it is almost
impossible for Associations to attract and retain staff with sufficient training or
skills in community development to work effectively in the estate environment.
Policy making and the process of selection to adjudicate which Associations are
to receive transfers of public housing appear to lack transparency “there’s a
panel apparently … It’s a sort of mysterious panel.” When asked what the
reasons might be for promoting transfers as the means of growing the Associ-
ation sector, there was a strong sense of this practice being imposed on housing
associations. Community housing managers said “It’s a government policy—ask
the government!” “I really don’t know—I suspect it’s because we pay people
less” … “I can’t see any real advantage” and “trying to read between the lines,
maybe its cost” “it’s the only idea they’ve got in there isn’t it”. Yet all stated they
would continue to accept them “because politically its bad news to say no”. A
housing manager from an organisation that had previously taken a policy
decision not to accept transfers because “we would have had to take them in an
area that we didn’t consider ours.… we’re very much of the belief that Housing
Associations should be local”, said that they would probably begin seeking them
because there would be no other capacity for growth in the future.
Many other areas of philosophical and policy divergence are apparent in the
interview data. These include: an emphasis on smallness as a key factor in the
ability of Associations to deliver high quality tenant management versus the
notion that only large increases in stock under management can provide
viability; a consistent contention that it is Associations and the State Authority
working alongside each other “competing” which generates innovation and
responsiveness, set alongside the view that a single provider would be more cost
effective in regional areas; and tension between the idea of flexibility and the
need for common standards and policies, shared allocation processes, etc. in the
name of equity.
Tasmania
Discussions about stock transfers in Tasmania have had a long gestation period.
The interview data reveal divergent perspectives but also areas of substantive
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agreement amongst the range of key actors (tenants, housing associations, peak
bodies and the SHA). There are currently 12 066 public housing dwellings and
456 community housing dwellings in Tasmania. The largest community housing
association is Red Shield (managed by the Salvation Army) and the primary
association to have negotiated the transfer of public stock. This transfer com-
menced in 1998 when 120 empty public housing properties were handed over
for Red Shield to manage. As part of this agreement, the State government
provided $50 000 as seed funding (Donoghue, 2001). While the properties were
vacant at the time of transfer, as many as 40 new occupants were former tenants
of the SHA. The only other stock transfer to have taken place was five properties
handed over to Devon District Housing Cooperative.
In retrospect, the transfer of stock that took place in 1998 can be viewed as
the culmination of detailed policy deliberation and extensive consultation with
the community sector. Recently, the State government has reinvigorated policy
discussion on the scope of stock transfers following the launch of the ‘Affordable
Housing Strategy’ in early 2003. Despite the small number of properties that
have been transferred to date, there is an expectation that the transfer of more
stock to community housing associations might enable the State government to
leverage Commonwealth Rental Assistance funds.3
The arguments for and against stock transfer as a policy instrument for
social housing provision have already been touched upon in the Victorian and
NSW studies. In Tasmania, the discussions are broadly similar but without any
accompanying discussion in newspapers or policy journals. The main strategic
question that has generated conflict is whether or not the SHA should pursue
stock transfers in order to generate resources via Commonwealth Rental Assist-
ance payments. Those in favour of stock transfer generally view it as a pragmatic
innovation to attract more resources, while those opposed to stock transfers raise
concerns about tenants’ statutory rights and their security.
There is more agreement amongst key actors about three of the key strategic
issues. First, that stock transfers do not in themselves result in an increase in
supply of social housing; second, that there is limited capacity within the
Community Housing Association sector to manage more transferred stock; and
third, that significant stock transfer would result in a diminution of the SHA’s
role as a direct provider of services. These three key strategic issues are
discussed in turn.
Generating additional income. The continued interest in further stock transfer
arrangements is predicated on the assumption that the Commonwealth govern-
ment will continue to reduce subsidies for public housing and instead resource
low-cost housing either though subsidies to homeowners (first time buyers
grants) or individual subsidies to low-income households through Common-
wealth rental assistance payments. In this political context, it is acknowledged
that stock transfers could be a vehicle to capture additional funds, as tenants in
housing association stock are eligible for Commonwealth Rental Assistance. As
one interviewee from within the Housing Authority acknowledged “community
housing can actually leverage additional dollars, it can bring in additional
services because of the capacity to (sic) Commonwealth Rent Assistance, so
there’s an official kind of shift of the dollars from the Commonwealth to the
State”. Another interviewee adopted a similar perspective:
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Fundamentally, the Commonwealth Government prefers to allocate
recurrent payments to clients rather than to SHAs. They’d rather put
the money into client’s pockets so that they can then go and choose the
provider and so on and they know one of the things is that there has
been a consistent decline in funds via Commonwealth/State Housing
Agreement.
One government interviewee was very clear about the problems of not transfer-
ring stock:
by not transferring out stock then you are not able to take advantage of
the factors that are out there like Commonwealth Rent Assistance.… we
expect that this CHSA may well be the last capital funding bucket for
states and we expect by that point that the Commonwealth will provide
most of its assistance through a recurrent rental payment.
Alongside the pragmatic rationale for additional resources is a set of other
claims made primarily by the ‘not for profit’ sector that small community run
housing associations are better able to provide a responsive management service
than large SHAs. Stock transfers, it is argued, can provide a fast track route to
increasing the size and viability of the community housing sector, so long as the
stock that is transferred is of a good standard and not simply hard to let
properties.
It was apparent from the focus group discussion, that tenants residing in
stock that had been transferred were overwhelmingly supportive of their com-
munity housing association landlord. Interviewees, attending the focus group,
suggested that their rents were both affordable (maximum rent is $100) and the
service provided by Red Shield was responsive and user-friendly. “I’d like to say
if you’ve got problems Red Shield will help you out as much as they can.”
Interviewees felt that they had more autonomy as a community housing resident
as the following quote makes clear: “well you can do things in community
housing that you couldn’t do with [public] housing. Like repaint the place, but
with [public] housing you don’t have as many rights.” The endorsement of
tenants for the services provided is indicative of the high level of satisfaction
amongst community housing tenants in Tasmania.4 However, the optimism of
tenant and community activists stands in direct contrast with a number of actors
within the government and peak body sectors. One interviewee’s comments
encapsulated a general concern with stock transfers “my biggest problem with
stock transfer is that it doesn’t actually increase affordable housing because all
you’re doing is changing the management style”.
Limited capacity of the ‘not for profit’ sector. In the case of Tasmania, the biggest
obstacle to extending the stock transfer process is the perceived lack of capacity
within the ‘not for profit’ sector. As one community housing sector interviewee
pointed out “we’ve got a very small sector, so we haven’t necessarily got the
resources, so part of the stock transfer concept was to try and give it a bit of a
helping hand, to try and develop an alternative provider”. Comments such as
this were articulated by actors working for the ‘not for profit’ sector as well as
those working for the SHA. It can be discerned from recent UK literature
(Malpass & Mullins, 2002) that if stock transfers are to go ahead in Tasmania, it
will be prudent for the current SHA affordable housing strategy to provide
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practical measures to enhance the infrastructure and generate resources for
community housing agencies to extend their role. One of the most interesting
explanations to account for the State government’s willingness to resource
community housing was provided by one interviewee working in the SHA, “it’s
all about competition, … there was a lot of criticism then about ineffective large
bureaucracies, so encouraging the community sector to manage housing fitted
neatly with this perspective”. This viewpoint conforms closely to some of the
ideological arguments adopted from a neo-liberal perspective; that is that the
break up of monolithic service providers and the introduction of competition
will result in improved delivery outcomes.
Diminution of the State government’s role. However, in spite of the commitment
of the SHA to seek ways of supporting the community sector, interviewees from
the ‘not for profit’ sector were less sanguine about the chances of further stock
transfer. One interviewee suggested that in spite of stated policy objectives
“there is resistance from some within the housing authority sector because
predominately they don’t want their good properties to get transferred or want
large numbers of stock to be transferred because then they won’t have a job”.
However, another interviewee took a contrary view, suggesting instead that it
was in the State government’s political interest to divulge itself of responsibility
for low-cost housing:
my cynical view is that with a community tenancy you shift the
responsibility from the government to the private sector and so there-
fore issues such as evictions, conditions of properties, vacancies, per-
ceived non-action on the waiting list and seeing properties vacant and
all the rest of it would no longer be the Government’s concern. I think
it is in the Government’s interest to pass the responsibilities to others
to be able to say “Oh well we no longer manage those properties. You
need to go to Colony or Red Shield to sort those things out”. A large
community housing sector would take the heat off the Government.
It can be discerned from the divergent views that housing policy in
Tasmania is at a critical juncture. While there is no existing policy in place to
pursue a new stock transfer program, the discussions taking place around the
affordable housing strategy indicate that policies to diversify the public housing
stock in Tasmania are being actively considered and that stock transfers are
almost certain to form an integral component of future strategy.
Conclusions
The focus group discussions with tenants, interviews with key policy actors in
government and ‘not for profit’ housing sectors provide a rich source of
information. It highlights in microcosm some of the key tensions about the role
of welfare and debates about appropriate models for service delivery. A number
of important issues can be discerned from the three case studies in Victoria,
NSW and Tasmania.
First, the public–private mix appropriate for social housing remains deeply
contested. At present in Australia, the discourse of ‘community’ has drawn
increasing political support and expressions of this support were evident from
the responses of many of the interviewees. In some sense, this is not unexpected
‘Changing the Mix’ 261
for as Gilbert (2002, p. 163) has argued: community models for “service delivery
respond to the anti-statist, market-orientated ideology of the Right; to the
citizens’ empowerment objectives of the Left; and most of all to the modern
infatuation with civil society on both sides of the political spectrum”.
Second, it should come as no surprise that community housing is seen as
preferable by many tenants. A feature of contemporary policy making is that
whilst private agencies are heralded as innovative and responsive to consumer
needs, public sector institutions are often portrayed as unwieldy and remote.
However, it is also true that, up to the present, there has been no fair basis for
comparison between tenant experiences in public and community housing, as a
number of study participants from the public housing authorities were keen to
point out.
Third, the prospect of large-scale stock transfer in each state remains a very
controversial issue. A number of policy actors interviewed for this project
(particularly in Victoria) wanted to move away from the polarised positions that
have characterised the policy process so far. There was an expressed desire to
establish some common interests. In moving towards this goal, part of the
controversy over stock transfers needs to be seen within a broader debate about
the role of governments and their direct responsibility to provide affordable,
secure housing. Some policy actors in each of the three states viewed stock
transfers as a form of privatisation and questioned the effectiveness and
efficiency of this strategy, while others claimed that the community sector has
distinct benefits and needs to be regarded differently from private interests
because of an explicit non-profit focus. This micro debate reflects broader
changes in the mixed economy of welfare, which are taking place in other areas
of social policy, such as employment services. On this point, Little (2002) argues
that when we examine contemporary debates about community-based options
we need to ask its advocates to stop providing answers and to start recognising
the questions.
Fourth, both tenant advocates and community housing providers/peak
organisations want to see clarity and some clear political direction on these
issues in the future. There is a sense in which the policy process has drifted.
Tenant advocates in both NSW and Victoria in particular wanted to see the
establishment of a clear policy framework for why stock transfers should take
place, starting from the position of mandated tenant outcomes in an agreed
regulatory framework that contains meaningful guarantees and reporting re-
quirements.
Fifth, it is clear that at the policy level, the most pressing priority is the need
to increase the financial viability of the social housing sector and an expectation
that stock transfer might be one of the means to achieve this viability.
Whilst others may see stock transfer as undesirable it is this financial imperative
which appears to be the main driver for policy innovation in this area, yet it
remains unclear how it is expected that large-scale stock will advance this
cause.
Uncertainty about the financing of social housing provision is the primary
factor that can best explain the emerging debates and contestation about the
role of stock transfer in all three states. Continued uncertainty is likely to
prolong contestation as well as undermine SHAs’ efforts to develop coherent
policies to offset the decline in Commonwealth funding for public housing
provision.
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Notes
1. The Australian Institute of Health defines community housing dwellings and Welfare (2003) as
those funded (either capital or recurrently) through the CSHA; where tenancy management
functions are undertaken by a community provider or local government; provides medium to
long-term housing. It specifically excludes dwellings funded under the Crisis Accommodation
Program.
2. There is very little public information available on the type of projects funded and the outcomes
achieved from this investment (Community Housing Federation of Victoria, 2003).
3. This expectation is premised on the basis that tenants who reside in community housing
properties can be charged higher rent than those in public housing and therefore are able to
access Commonwealth Rental Assistance.
4. In a national survey of community housing tenants, Tasmania has the highest level of tenant
satisfaction (88 per cent) in Australia (8 per cent higher than the national average) (Donovan
Research, 2001, pp. 8–9; Donoghue & Tranter, 2003).
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